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SCIENCE AND FOLK SENTIMENTS
Undo Uus
It is generally believed that traditional or commonsense beliefs that
contradict scientific views must recede. I will argue that such an
opinion is not always justified. In particular, I claim that the mod-
ern scientific notion of the fundamental nature of the world and life
may very likely prove to be false, whereas some relevant “unscien-
tific” folk sentiments may prove to be essentially correct.
Science and traditional common sense, which both seek truth, are
not adversaries. Science can even be regarded as a sophisticated
and highly disciplined form of common sense. Therefore it might
seem that we should always prefer scientific claims to traditional
folk beliefs.
It is undoubtedly true that folk sentiments cannot compete by any
means with most of what science tells us. Scientific claims express
the results of concerted efforts by large communities of highly edu-
cated and trained specialists who use very complicated technical
equipment and apply intricate theoretical methodologies. Consider,
for example, such fields of research as particle physics, cosmology,
or genetics. The world is not, however, a primitive entity and our
epistemic situation therein need not be simple. It is for that reason
that untutored common sense can in some respects be more ra-
tional than science. To understand how this can be so, let us turn
our attention to the perils inherent in our scientific pursuit of truth.
It is natural that we wish to ground our beliefs about the world on
as firm data as possible. It is also very reasonable that we attempt
to avoid any logical inconsistencies inside our belief systems. In
these regards the collection of folk sentiments is certainly much
inferior to the body of knowledge science advocates. Yet the lack of
a clear factual basis and the toleration of inconsistencies may give
commonsense reasoning definite advantages over scientific ratioci-
nation.8
THE PERILS OF THE SCIENTIFIC QUEST FOR A FIRM
BASIS OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
In general, the desire to found our beliefs upon firm and clear em-
pirical facts is commendable. It is always reasonable to establish, if
possible, a solid observational basis for a definite belief rather than
to hold to it relying upon vague and ambiguous data. It is therefore
understandable that science applies certain strict criteria a fact must
satisfy in order to be accepted as a basis for reliable conclusions.
However, using of such criteria may prove detrimental to our search
for truth. Our world may be – and I will argue that it very likely
actually is – of such character that the picture of the world formed
on the basis of the most trustworthy empirical data we currently
possess is incorrect, and that some very basic properties of the world
reveal themselves in the specific kinds of facts which common sense
recognizes but science, in its quest for utmost certainty and clarity,
rejects.
Science acknowledges as truly scientific only the so-called objective
facts, i.e. the facts that are publicly accessible (Hempel 1958). This
class of facts consists of data about the formal (abstract) structure
and dynamics of the physical world (Carnap 1969). On the basis of
these data a conclusion of paramount importance for our under-
standing of the world has been drawn. In all cases the physical proc-
esses have been rigorously investigated, their dynamics have proved
lawful, either deterministically or probabilistically, and it has been
inductively concluded that the dynamics of the world are thoroughly
law-governed. This claim is regarded as the main doctrine of the
scientific world-view, and from that it follows that the world is
ontologically mundane or, in common parlance, natural. Everything
that takes place is determined, in the final reckoning, by the laws
of physical dynamics obeyed by the fundamental constituents of
matter.
We ourselves are also regarded as thoroughly material (though
structurally extremely complicated) beings. In this case our behavior,
being determined by our cerebral dynamics, is also entirely law-
governed, i.e. subject to the combination of rigid determinism and
blind (quantum) chance. This in effect means that we are not free
in our deeds, that we have never been able to act other than we9
actually did, or, more precisely, we could have behaved otherwise
only as a result of some purely random, indeterministic quantum
events.
It is doubtful, however, whether this scientific doctrine is correct.
It is in direct contradiction with commonsense views. According to
folk psychology, we are in command of our voluntary activity. In
everyday life people regard themselves and others as creatures with
free will who are able to have behaved otherwise than they have in
fact chosen to. It is for precisely that reason that people are consid-
ered to be morally responsible for their actions. Is such a common
belief an “unscientific” superstition without rational basis? No, it is
not. Our belief in possessing free will is empirically justified. We
are able to clearly discriminate between what happens to us inde-
pendently of our will (like heart beating, muscle convulsion, sneez-
ing etc.) and what happens due to our own efforts. The empirical
information about our possessing free will lies in the specific phe-
nomenal quality of our efforts of will, the quality we call “the feel-
ing of freedom.”
Modern science does not acknowledge the feeling of freedom as a
scientific empirical fact. First of all, the experiences of efforts of
will are the phenomena of consciousness and thus not publicly ob-
servable but may be witnessed only privately – introspectively. Sci-
ence is very reluctant to regard introspection as a genuine scien-
tific observation. Moreover, the information about having free will
lies in the phenomenal quality of experiences, but the qualities of
this kind – qualia – are, unlike structural information, ineffable and
cannot thus be interpersonally communicated.
As concerns access, verifiability and communicability, the facts about
qualia are not as “good” as the facts about physical phenomena, and
modern science does not recognize them. If they contradict the ac-
cepted scientific beliefs, science claims them to be merely deceptive
feelings. Is the discarding of the “bad” data reasonable? It is un-
doubtedly reasonable only if we have “good” data which supply us
with the same kind of information but of better quality than the
“bad” data. This might be regarded, with reservations, as reason-
able also if we were to hold real hope of obtaining the relevant
“good” data in the foreseeable future. But this discarding is utterly
unreasonable, if the “bad” data provide us with essential informa-10
tion the “good” data cannot do for being unobtainable, either practi-
cally or even in principle.
Modern science, in its quest to rely only upon the observational and
experimental data of the most simple and clear kind, ignores other
kinds of empirical data which can and very probably do contain ex-
tremely valuable information that belies some of the main scien-
tific doctrines deduced on the basis of the data science recognizes.
COMMONSENSE REALISM TOWARDS THE EMPIRICAL
Common sense does not aspire to absolutely clear and firm grounds
for its judgments and does not apply stringent – and thus poten-
tially unreasonable – criteria for the acceptance of facts. It recog-
nizes, for example, the feeling of freedom, which accompanies our
voluntary activity, as an unquestionable and very important fact
about the basic character of our conduct. The advantage of common
sense over modern science lies in its greater tolerance of diversity:
it does not restrict itself by paying attention only to the “best” kind
of data. Moreover, as concerns the specific variety of the data in
question – phenomenal experiences – it has no significant disad-
vantages in comparison with science because introspective obser-
vations, unlike physical measurements, cannot be much enhanced
by using sophisticated technical equipment. For that reason folk
psychology can even today successfully compete with science in of-
fering a sound basis for the beliefs concerning the fundamental char-
acter of our nature.
One can, of course, doubt whether it is reasonable to trust the sub-
jective feeling of being a creature possessing free will (and thus not
law-governed), as this conflicts with what science asserts. There is,
however, additional evidence that folk sentiments about our nature
are probably basically correct. This evidence issues from our sub-
jective knowledge of our tendency to seek pleasant and avoid un-
pleasant experiences.
The qualitative character of our experiences in many cases has a
hedonistic dimension by being pleasant or unpleasant to a certain
degree. Consider various tastes, smells, sounds, pains etc. It is ob-
vious to common sense why we seek pleasant experiences and try11
to avoid unpleasant ones. We try to eradicate pain, for example,
because pain has an intrinsically awful character. And it is also ob-
vious to us that the unpleasant intrinsic character of the pain con-
ditions our efforts directed at eradicating pain. But the modern sci-
entific ideology maintains that intrinsic properties cannot have any
effect upon what takes place in the world. A property that could
have a causal power must be a relational property: a relation be-
tween cause and effect. Phenomenal qualia, however, are not the
properties causing definite cerebral events necessary for inducing
bodily behavior: if this were so, then our consciousness of them
would consist in our being aware of the processes they evoke in the
brain, but this is clearly not the case. Phenomenal qualia as intrin-
sic properties are, so to speak, things in themselves with no po-
tency to causally necessitate the occurrence of anything else. On
this ground modern science and materialistic philosophy even dis-
claim the existence of phenomenal qualia. The existence of qualia
is denied either explicitly (Dennett 1991), or implicitly (see, e.g.
Hardcastle 1996) by assigning to the word ‘qualia’ a meaning that
has nothing to do with phenomenal qualities but refers instead to
definite neurodynamical cerebral processes which can, in principle,
be described in formal-structural terms and observed publicly.
Folk psychology holds firmly to the realist position regarding sen-
sations. After all, we have the least possible reason to doubt having
experiences: they are empirical data we are directly aware of. Com-
mon sense, being theoretically unsophisticated, finds no reason to
deny that which is empirically given. Modern science and philoso-
phy, in contrast, give much weight to theoretical speculations and
hypotheses concerning conceptions of the world in deciding on the
nature of the world. And there is very probably something wrong
with these theoretical speculations and hypotheses other than the
fact that we do not in fact have phenomenal experiences. We can
say that one of the advantages of folk thinking over scientific rea-
soning is its lesser regard for theoretical speculations and greater
respect for that which is empirically given.
One might now think that the folk-psychological position that we
are able to respond to our experiences in accordance with their
qualitative character must, nevertheless, be wrong, because the
intrinsic properties of experiences cannot serve as causes of any-12
thing. But folk psychology has a quick answer to this problem. It
holds that our reactions to experiences are not necessitated by our
experiences, but are caused by our free will. Though experiences
themselves cannot, indeed, cause any effects, we, being aware of
our experiences and, as free creatures, being able to evoke our
behavioral acts without being causally necessitated to do so, can
behave, being rational creatures, in accordance with the content of
our experiences. That the character of our experiences does not
strictly necessitate our behavior is obvious to common sense from
the fact that we can, if we wish, behave irrationally, i.e. not in ac-
cord with the content of our experiences.
Consequently, the fact that we are able to adequately respond to
the qualitative character of our experiences is additional and very
firm evidence that we possess free will.
THE DANGERS OF INFATUATION WITH ELEGANT
EXPLANATORY SCHEMES
Yet why does science refuse so obstinately to recognize the intrin-
sic qualitative properties of experiences? It is indeed utterly
counterintuitive to argue that having phenomenal experiences is
merely a deceptive illusion. The reason for this is that if science
admitted that we have phenomenal experiences, and are able to
respond to them adequately by using our free will, it would then
also have to admit that the world is at least partly non-natural or
supernatural, which means that the world cannot be described on
the basis of an elegant and simple model, as science nowadays does.
It is natural that we like beauty and elegance. This is also true of
explanatory schemes in science. It is widely believed that a math-
ematically elegant scientific theory has a better chance of being
true than a cumbersome ad hoc theory. This belief is very probably
basically correct.
Science, commanding vast intellectual resources, is able to effec-
tively realize its striving towards theoretical elegance. And one of
its most general and elegant theoretical constructions is the mod-
ern scientific world-view – the materialistic understanding of the
world. According to the materialistic image of the world, the world13
is by nature homogeneous and simple. It consists, in final account,
of only a few basic physical constituents or fundamental physical
fields. (Many physicists even suppose that there may actually be
only one such fundamental component.) The behavior of these con-
stituents is causally determined: it obeys the fundamental laws of
physical dynamics. The multifarious richness of phenomena in the
world – including biological forms of life and social processes – is
combinatorial in character: simple constituents of nature can form,
being combined in specific intricate ways, various systems of very
different properties.
However, it is too optimistic to hope that the basic nature of the
world is so simple that we are already able to comprehend it. The
world may even be so complicated that it will never be possible to
discover its fundamental essence. It is quite probable our under-
standing of the world represents only particular general features of
the world, as they appear to us on the basis of the knowledge of the
world that we have hitherto obtained. The world-view must change
with our acquisition of new knowledge, and it is therefore unrea-
sonable to demand that it should be elegant at every stage of its
development. This applies also to scientific theories of a more lim-
ited scope. It is difficult to satisfy the requirement of completeness
and elegance during the process of development.
It is difficult to introduce into the modern scientific world-view any
essential modifications without marring its elegance. If we wish to
admit that the functioning of only definite systems in the world is
accompanied by entities – conscious experiences with their intrin-
sic qualitative properties – which belong to an entirely different
category than physical fields, and that the behavior of only definite
systems is determined by free will rather than by causal necessity,
we must subscribe to a dualistically nonhomogeneous world-view
that is aesthetically unpleasing. Nevertheless, such an eclectic
world-view is very probably closer to the truth than the elegant
materialistic image of the world, for it takes seriously the empirical
data to which we have access.
Folk sentiments do not strive to form a complete and elegant sys-
tem. Ordinary people do not hesitate to admit that only some sys-
tems in the world have experiences and possess free will. The ab-
sence of a strong craving for elegance is, in some respects, an ad-14
vantage of common sense over scientific thought, for it renders folk
belief complexes flexible towards the admission of various very dif-
ferent concepts. Science is more susceptible to a temptation to ap-
ply simple and therefore potentially inadequate schemes in describ-
ing and explaining non-mundane real phenomena.
QUESTIONABILITY OF THE REQUIREMENT OF
INTELLIGIBILITY
Science requires that the concepts we use to describe reality must
be intelligible – fully understandable to a human mind. This de-
mand is natural: our understanding of the world is more profound if
we clearly understand what we are discussing when we use definite
concepts to describe the world. On the basis of this principle, mod-
ern science considers the concepts of qualia and free will to be highly
suspect. The phenomenal qualia are ineffable and incommunicable;
they can be neither analyzed nor registered. It is impossible to com-
prehend how there can be a third possibility in dynamics – free-will
behavior – in addition to deterministic and probabilistic dynamics,
or a combination thereof.
The requirement to use only intelligible concepts in trying to de-
scribe the world is, however, unreasonable. This demand would be
sensible only if we were certain that the world is so primitive that
we can understand clearly everything it contains. But this is not
necessarily the case. The world can contain entities and properties
which are not mundane and are for us “unintelligible.” And, if we
are aware of such phenomena, we must not deny their existence
merely on the ground that it is difficult to comprehend their es-
sence clearly. Even time is unintelligible in this sense: it is impossi-
ble to avoid circularity in explaining the nature of time, its “pass-
ing” in the course of which the present “moves” to the past. But this
gives us no cause to deny the reality of time. Thus though we can-
not explain the nature of the unpleasantness of pain, we are not
justified in denying the existence of pain. In the same way that we
have the faculty of comprehending directly and intuitively, without
any need for further analysis, that there is a time flow, so we also
have the faculty for comprehending directly and intuitively the in-
trinsic qualities of experiences. And we are also justified in trusting15
our intuitive grasping of our freedom of will, notwithstanding that
we are unable to analyze what that exactly means. After all, such
entities like time, experiential qualities and freedom of will may
well be fundamental entities, which are, in principle, unanalyzable,
i.e. not reducible to something more fundamental and simple.
Common sense does not require the concepts it recognizes to be
intelligible. It trusts intuition. Phenomena that may be grasped
directly and intuitively – such as time, experiential qualities and
freedom of will – are unquestionably recognized by common sense.
Yet common sense tends to acknowledge even phenomena that re-
quire subtlety in order to be grasped intuitively. One such phenom-
enon is our possession of souls.
THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OF IMMATERIAL SOULS
By soul we mean our (possible) immaterial “core.” It is difficult to
define with precision the basis of the commonsense idea that a per-
son has an immaterial soul. The possession of a soul is not a di-
rectly comprehensible intuitive fact. Probably the main reason for
introducing the concept of a soul was the opinion that matter itself
is lifeless, inert, inactive, and that the source of our activity must
be something immaterial. This view is, of course, erroneous: as we
know, complicated material systems like robots can be very active.
However, when introducing the concept of an immaterial soul as
the source of activity, people probably kept in mind the specific char-
acter of their own activity: that this is a genuinely freewill activity.
And the source of this kind of activity cannot reside in material
systems – that truth is also recognized by materialistic philosophy.
But there is probably also another vague intuition behind the idea
of having a soul: the intuition that one’s personal identity can be
guaranteed only by one’s possessing an immaterial soul.
An elderly man is considered the same person as the young boy he
once was. What is the basis of this identity if he as a material crea-
ture is now so different from what he was in his youth? Recent
philosophical investigations (Parfit 1986) have shown that, indeed,
nothing material can guarantee the personal identity through time.
This fact is most explicitly demonstrated by the so-called reduplica-
tion paradox (see, e.g. Uus 1994): Imagine that your body will be16
decomposed and thereafter reconstituted in two duplicates; which
one is then you? Such sophisticated speculations do not lie behind
the common sense belief in immaterial souls. Its grounds for adopt-
ing this idea are rather indistinct. And this is probably the reason
for which the belief in our having immaterial souls has not in mod-
ern societies withstood the pressure of the scientific ideology.
FOLK SENTIMENTS DO NOT SUFFER FROM PRESTIGE
COMPLEX
If conscious beings have free will and immaterial souls, then the
world is not thoroughly natural. Modern science does not like this
possibility. Why? One reason is that the world’s turning out to be at
least partly supernatural is disadvantageous to aspirations of the
intelligibility of the scientific description of the world. I think, how-
ever, that there is also another more subjective reason for which
science dislikes any kinds of possible supernatural entities and phe-
nomena.
Modern science maintains that all terrestrial phenomena are natu-
ral, and that none are supernatural. Science argues that this view
should be accepted because we have no evidence casting doubt on
it. Is this indeed so? Of course not. The phenomenal qualia do not
fit into the causal fabric of a natural world. Our possession of free
will is not compatible with our being thoroughly natural creatures.
If modern science were ideologically impartial, it would, on the ba-
sis of these facts, also be considering the possibility that the world
is not entirely natural. But science does not do this. It uses all its
power to downplay the importance of data which discredit the doc-
trine of the naturalness of the world. Science prefers to deny the
existence of experiences than to acknowledge that not everything
in our world is natural. Modern science strongly dislikes the possi-
bility that the world may prove to be supernatural. One of the rea-
sons for which science has adopted such a stance is its striving for
high prestige.
If the world is natural, then everything can, in principle, be fully
understood and explained. In such a world science would be an
omnipotent intellectual authority. But if definite terrestrial phe-
nomena are supernatural and thus not entirely transparent to a17
human mind, they cannot be fully, if at all, scientifically explained.
Scientists are then forced to admit that they are powerless in the
face of specific phenomena. They must abandon the image of their
potentially omnipotent understanding of the world that they pres-
ently enjoy. Abhorrence of the supernatural is a symptom of the
prestige complex from which modern science suffers.
Ordinary people do not suffer from such a prestige complex and do
not abhor the possibility that some terrestrial phenomena may be
supernatural. To the contrary, to many of us the partial supernatu-
ralness of the world is its positive property – such a world is un-
doubtedly a more interesting place to live in than a thoroughly natu-
ral world. Ordinary people are much more tolerant towards various
possible ontological essences of the world than is modern science.
The best evidence that people quite easily accept even the view
that the world is highly supernatural are widespread religious be-
liefs in the existence of a very powerful supernatural being – God.
And it is highly probable that such a being indeed exists.
THE TRADITIONAL BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
MAY PROVE TRUE
Modern science, maintaining that the world is natural, is decidedly
against the view that God rules the world. And we must agree that
traditional arguments supporting religious views – such as the texts
of the scriptures, or various myths – are unconvincing indeed. Sci-
ence suggests that people advanced the idea of God because they
were unable to explain in natural terms the presence of life on
Earth, and ascribed the creation of life, and subsequently also the
creation of the entire world, to a powerful being. This is probably
true, but I think people also had another ground for introducing the
idea of there being an omnipotent supernatural agent. This idea
can namely be regarded as a relatively ordinary hypothesis: people,
being introspectively aware that they themselves are free agents of
a definite though rather limited creative power, assumed that there
might exist a being (or beings) of the same fundamental nature as
they themselves – freewill beings capable of creative acts – but im-
mensely more powerful.18
The idea of a superpowerful freewill being is the most outstanding
of all ideas people have had or can ever have. This idea is the basis
of most systems of religious belief. The belief in God is, or at least
has been, also one of the most widespread folk beliefs. Modern sci-
ence, however, is extremely sceptical of the possibility of the exist-
ence of God. Who might prove to be right in this historical confron-
tation – traditional religious and folk sentiments or the modern
doctrines of science? What can we say, on the basis of the present-
day level of human knowledge and reasoning, about whether God
exists or not?
In trying to answer from the philosophical viewpoint the question
of God’s possible existence, it is sensible not to regard God as an
infinitely powerful freewill being, but rather as an immensely pow-
erful one. First, the idea of an infinitely powerful being is probably
self-contradictory, and, secondly, in any practically important sense
there is no difference for us whether God is infinitely powerful, or
has sufficient immense power. To avoid terminological confusion,
let us call the immensely but not infinitely powerful being not God,
but Superpowerful Freewill Agent, SFA for short. And let us divide
the given problem into two parts: (i) How plausible is the hypoth-
esis that SFA can exist? and (ii) Do we have any arguments in favor
of the fact that SFA actually exists?
Let me begin by emphasizing a fact of which unsophisticated com-
mon sense is not aware but which is obvious to a philosophical mind:
The hypothesis that a Superpowerful Freewill Agent exists is a
rather “mild” further suggestion compared with the acceptance of
the view that we ourselves are freewill beings. When we maintain
that we have genuine free will incompatible with the thesis that we
are thoroughly material law-governed beings, we thereby reject the
view that the world is entirely natural. This claim is a very radical
qualitative claim, for it asserts that the world is not by nature mun-
dane, but contains something that is, to a certain degree, definitely
supernatural. Having accepted this view, the hypothesis that there
may exist freewill agents much more powerful than ourselves is
merely a quantitative one: we do not introduce any new kind of
fundamental properties into the world but only assume that some-
one can surpass us significantly in respect of some of our own abili-
ties. The suggestion that we are not the most powerful freewill19
beings in the world is much more plausible than the suggestion
that we are. We are not the largest, heaviest, “hottest” etc. “things”
in the world, so why should we believe that we are the bearers of
the greatest amount of supernaturalness in the world?
Given the high plausibility of the hypothesis that there exists a
Superpowerful Freewill Agent, there is reason to wonder if we have
any evidence that such a being actually exists in our world. One of
the basic philosophical claims of modern science is that we do not
possess any such evidence, and therefore the hypothesis concern-
ing SFA is purely speculative, without any empirical support. Moreo-
ver, as science maintains that we ourselves are purely natural be-
ings, it does not see any reason for considering this hypothesis ten-
able. And it is, indeed, true that if we consider the data that science
recognizes as genuinely scientific – i.e. data about the structure
and dynamics of physical reality – there is not as yet the slightest
hint of the possible activity of some SFA. All scientific data obtained
to date can be explained entirely naturally, and if not yet actually
then at least allegedly in principle. Nor has common sense pointed
to any facts that could reveal the presence of an SFA in our world.
Common sense has found no evidence of the existence of an SFA
because it has sought for it in the wrong place: in the realm of the
same kind of phenomena – in the structure and dynamics of the
material world – which is also the only field of research of modern
natural sciences. Folk imagination has sought for God’s existence
in possible non-natural events in the physical world, the most dras-
tic of which could be the alleged creation by God of the material
world, in the course of which the principle of natural causation,
with the corresponding laws of conservation, would have been radi-
cally broken. It is very difficult indeed for common sense to see the
appearance of the activity of the hypothetical SFA in our world,
because this requires sophisticated reasoning. Only modern philo-
sophical discussions have revealed such phenomena as cannot even
in principle naturally be explained.
It is obvious that the best evidence for the existence of a Super-
powerful Freewill Agent is provided by phenomena that clearly cannot
even in principle be explained by natural causes or by actions of
human-type freewill agents. Are we aware of any such phenomena?
Yes, we definitely are. These phenomena are so common and so20
“close” to us that hardly anyone suspects them to be puzzling. Here
I refer to the “evoking” by our brains of our experiences.
The connection between mental processes and phenomenal qualia
is contingent: there are no logical or metaphysical reasons for which
given brain processes are accompanied by the qualia they in fact
are (see Chalmers 1996). It is impossible, for example, to provide
any explanation of why definite patterns of neuron firings give rise
to the experience of red rather than blue color. In the words of
Thomas Huxley, “how it is that anything so remarkable as a state of
consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue,
is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin
rubbed his lamp.” It is evident that non-phenomenal physical enti-
ties themselves lack a causal power to evoke the phenomena of
consciousness. One might now suppose that mental processes need
not have this kind of power, for it is sufficient if there is a law of
nature according to which, whenever specific neuronal processes
take place, specific phenomena of consciousness also appear. But in
that case the causal potency of evoking consciousness must reside
in this law itself, which must thus exist over and above the physical
world.
A merely abstract law cannot guarantee the appearance of phe-
nomenal experiences in response to mental processes. What we
need here is a very real “something” that must have two remark-
able properties. First it must have the power of evoking certain
phenomena – conscious experiences – without any causal assistance,
because mental processes themselves lack such power. Secondly, it
must itself select the law of correspondence between mental proc-
esses and phenomenal qualia because of the contingent character
of such correspondences. Hence this “something” must be a freewill
agent. And it is no wonder that we require a freewill agent to estab-
lish a connection between physical (mental) processes and phenom-
enal qualia, because the psychophysical relations of the opposite
direction – from qualia to our bodily responses thereto – are effec-
tuated, as I explained above, by us as freewill beings. The freewill
agent, which provides us, as well as other living beings, with con-
scious experiences, must be extremely powerful. This agent must
be able to create contemporaneously a large variety of conscious21
experiences according to a definite regular law. Such a being can
rightly be called a Superpowerful Freewill Agent.
In summary, we can quite confidently say that we are aware of the
phenomena only SFA can produce – these are our experiences. We
have a relatively sound basis for insisting that a Superpowerful
Freewill Agent truly exists and participates actively in the func-
tioning of the world. In the confrontation between traditional senti-
ments and modern scientific doctrines on the issue of whether a
powerful supernatural being exists, it is therefore highly probable
that truth is on the side of traditional beliefs.
SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADITIONAL FOLK SENTIMENTS
IN MODERN SCIENTIFIC ERA
It is usually believed that in our modern scientific era traditional
folk beliefs, if they are not in compliance with what science teaches,
are anachronisms which should best be abandoned. It may seem
that we need to know them, like the philosophical ideas of past
times, only in order to possess an overview of how human thought
has evolved over the centuries. These old folk sentiments and philo-
sophical ideas are deemed unable to compete with modern scien-
tific views.
It is unquestionably true that the achievements of modern science
are tremendous. Due to science-based technology our everyday life
is today entirely different from what it once used to be. The huge
amount of concrete knowledge about a great variety of natural proc-
esses has been obtained, and could only have been obtained, by
means of the very intellectually demanding efforts of many genera-
tions of scholars. Traditional folk beliefs contribute virtually noth-
ing to the development of modern science, and in many cases these
beliefs are unjustified prejudices hampering the dissemination of
true knowledge.
However, the opinion that it would have been better for people to
abandon all folk beliefs that are in contradiction with modern scien-
tific teachings is deeply erroneous. All of the remarkable achieve-
ments of modern science are due to the exploration and exploita-
tion of only one particular kind of phenomena – the physical proc-22
esses of lawfully regular dynamics. The investigation of such phe-
nomena requires the application of only one particular kind of ex-
perimental and intellectual methodology. In the wake of immense
practical profit due to the application of such methodologies to such
processes, unjustified ontological and epistemological generaliza-
tions have won scientific approval: that all phenomena in the world
are law-governed material processes, and that all processes taking
place in the world can be studied by applying the so-called objective
scientific research methodology. But it is very likely, as I have at-
tempted to argue in this paper, that the fundamental nature of the
world is not so primitive. In order to be able to understand this
truth, we must dare to doubt whether the highly prestigious mod-
ern scientific world-view is correct. We should also master, at least
to a certain degree, definite concepts and ways of reasoning (intel-
lectual activity) not used or even recognized by modern science.
And it would also be conducive to our attempts to comprehend the
presence of non-natural processes in the world if we have some
ideas, albeit rather vague, about possible supernatural phenomena.
Knowledge of the history of philosophy and familiarity with present-
day philosophical debates is most favorable to this end. But this
kind of knowledge is the privilege of a very few. For most people,
and for all young people, the only practically available source of
unorthodox ideas  are “unscientific” folk sentiments, such as beliefs
in having (libertarian) free will and an immaterial soul. Modern
science attempts to erase such sentiments from the minds of peo-
ple. The most insidious tactic used to achieve this is to redefine the
meanings of ordinary words which have traditionally been used to
refer to phenomena science nowadays does not recognize. Thus, for
example, by freewill activity modern science usually means the au-
tonomic but entirely deterministic, complicated activity of material
systems (such as robots) and biological creatures. That kind of “free
will” (Dennett 1984) has nothing to do with the true, incompatibilist,
libertarian freedom of will (Van Inwagen 1983). The meanings of
crucial words being redefined, people are robbed of language neces-
sary to express “heretical” thoughts. If modern materialistic sci-
ence were to succeed in eradicating from people’s minds the ideas it
abhors, humankind would for a long time remain blind to the facts
on the basis of which the non-mundane nature of the world is evi-
dent.23
CONCLUSION
Contemporary science can be likened to a totalitarian regime that
applies in its judgement doctrines that are highly successful for
practical life. . Dissident folk sentiments appear very puny in com-
parison with the majesty and achievements of the scientific em-
pire. But in the long run the ridiculed dissident ideas may, however,
turn up to be right. And, as I have attempted to argue, this is very
probably what will happen. It is therefore desirable that traditional
folk sentiments, unless they are pure superstition, not die out. As
they cannot be explicitly advocated in the present scientific-ideo-
logical situation, their implicit propagation under the pretext of teach-
ing the history of folk beliefs should be very much appreciated.
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